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Cases, Controversies, and Direct Democracy: Overcoming
the Hollingsworth v. Perry Defensive Standing Obstacle
when State Executives Decline to Defend
Colton W Givens'
INTRODUCTION

On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court announced for the first time in Obergefell
v. Hodges that individuals have a fundamental right to marry the person of their
choice, regardless of their sex or the sex of their partner.2 But Obergefell did not
appear out of thin air-, rather, it was preceded by two groundbreaking decisions in
2013 concerning the definition of marriage in America. The first, United States v.
Windsor, struck down the provision of the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA),3 which defined marriage under federal law as the union of one man and
one woman.4 Windsor invited further litigation in the lower federal courts as
different groups and individuals challenged various state prohibitions against samesex marriage, but the Court finally settled the issue in Obergfrell. However, while
Windsor and Obergefell settled the issue of a nationwide right to same-sex marriage,
Windsor's companion case, Hollingsworth v. Perry,5 left open a significant question
that has the potential to impact a large number of U.S. citizens.
In Hollingsworth, the Court declined to address the merits of California's ban
on same-sex marriage, enacted by state citizens through the controversial
Proposition 8 ballot initiative. 6 Pursuant to California law, state citizens proposed
an amendment to the state constitution. 7 Approved by voters in 2008, Proposition
8 banned same-sex marriage in California, but was subsequently held
unconstitutional by the district court for the Northern District of California in
Perry v. Schwarzenegger.8 State executive officials, who opposed the amendment,
declined to defend Proposition 8. 9 The groups who proposed the initiative

1 University of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. expected May 2016. The author wishes to thank his
parents, Christopher and Gina Givens; his mentors, Dr. Winfield Rose, Professor Thomas Glover, and
Professor Allison Connelly, his extended family, friends, and law school classmates; and all others who
have supported him throughout his legal education.
2 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015).
3 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
4 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidatedin part by Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675.
s Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
6Id. at 2661, 2668.
7 See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9000-18 (LEXIS through Chapter 807 of
the 2015 Legislative Session) (describing the process governing initiative proposals).
'Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994-95 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
' Hollingswortb, 133 S. Ct. at 2660.
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attempted to step in,' but the Supreme Court held in Hollingswortb that these
proponents had no standing to defend the amendment."
Currently, voters in twenty-four states have the ability to amend their state
constitutions or pass new laws through ballot initiatives proposed by citizens,12 and
all states but Delaware allow voters to accept or reject constitutional amendments
proposed by the legislature. 13 These proposals may seek to accomplish a wide range
of objectives, from efforts to secure the "personal right to hunt, fish, and harvest
wildlife" 14 to such topics as education reform, gun control, abortion, and
environmental reform.15 For any number of reasons, the state's executive branch
may not support these objectives. The Court's decision in Hollingsworth allows
state officials who disagree with a duly-enacted amendment or law to effectively
veto the amendment by refusing to defend it in court.
This Note proposes that states that value the initiative and referendum devices
should recognize the threat posed to the integrity of those processes by the
Hollingswortb decision and should take steps to ensure that federal courts are able
to reach the merits of these cases. Part L.A explains the doctrine of Article III
standing, while Part I.B defines the two principal methods of amending state
constitutions-namely, ballot initiatives and legislative referenda. Part II explores
the convergence of these two subjects in Hollingswortb, discussing the difficulties
posed by the majority's decision and the practical problems that state constitutional
amendment processes now face. Finally, Part III proposes that states should adopt
legislation that specifically enables designated agents or proponents to defend
amendments and laws approved by voters when the executive branch declines to do
so. This measure will protect the integrity of the initiative and referendum,
ensuring that state constitutions remain adaptable to the ever-changing political
landscape in America.
I. STANDING, INITIATIVES, AND REFERENDA: A PRIMER

A. The Basics ofArticle Il Standing
Broadly speaking, standing is a party's ability to appear in court and be heard.
Standing is of particular importance in federal court, as Article III requires that a
.case or controvers[y]" must exist before a federal district court may take up a

10Id.
" Id. at 2663.
12M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 11-12 (2003).
" Marvin Krislov & Daniel M. Katz, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 17 CORNELLJ.L. &PUB.
POL Y 295, 301-02 n.23 (2008).
14 Ky. CONST. § 255A. This amendment was proposed by the Kentucky legislature and passed by
the voters in 2012. John Cheves, ConstitutionalAmendment to ProtectHunting and FishingPasses Easily,
KENTUCKY.COM (Nov. 6, 2012), http//www.kentucky.com/2012/11/06/2398379_constitutionalamendment-to-protect.html?rh= 1.
15WATERS, supra note 12, at 481,481-520.
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case.1 6 Standing must be present at all levels of a proceeding, from trial to final
appeal.17 Outside of this constitutional limitation, standing has historically been
grounded in the doctrine of separation of powers and the need for judicial
economy.1 8 A further justification for the doctrine is that "only plaintiffs raising
concrete grievances have sufficient interest to press their claims in the adversary
process."19 The sometimes strict requirements of standing have been widely
criticized by both liberals and conservatives, who allege that "[t]he Court . . .
advance[s] substantive interests under the guise of procedure."2" Indeed, the
Court's formulation and precise language of the standing elements often changes
from case to case.21 Nevertheless, lower federal courts continue to enforce the
standing requirements developed over time by the Court.
The Supreme Court has articulated a three-part conjunctive test for standing.
Litigants must demonstrate (1) an injury, (2) that is fairly traceable to the opposing
22
party's conduct, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
Typically, issues of standing arise at the trial level, when a plaintiff is unable to
demonstrate one of these three elements. Once a district court renders a decision,
the burden then shifts to the losing party to show standing to appeal. 23 If by the
time the appeal is taken the losing party lacks one of the three standing elements,
there is no longer any case or controversy before the appellate court, and the case
discussed below, is a specific application
will be dismissed.24 Hollingsworth v. Peny,
25
of this "defensive standing" problem.
Beginning with the first element, a litigant must demonstrate an "injury in fact"
that is "(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical."' The injury must be a "personal and tangible harm," not merely a
harm that the litigant is connected to tangentially. 27 Next, the injury must be "fairly
traceable" to the defendant's conduct; stated otherwise, the defendant must have
caused the injury. 28 Finally, even if a litigant demonstrates injury and causation, a

§ 2, d. 1.
17 Hollingswartb, 133 S. Ct. at 2661 (citing Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726
16U.S. CONST. art. 11,

(2013)).
" Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013); Richard M. Re, Relative Standing,
102 GEO. LJ. 1191, 1194 (2014).
19Re, supra note 18, at 1194.
2

Id. at 1195.
21Id. at 1194-95.
22 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
23 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997).
24
Id. at 64.
'5 "Defensive standing" refers to the requirement that the defendant in a given case must have a
direct stake in outcome of the case at all stages. In the context of initiatives and referenda, the defensive
standing problem arises when the government, the defendant in the trial court, does not pursue an
appeal, and other persons or groups attempt to step into the shoes of the government for appeal
purposes.
26Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
27Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013).
2' Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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decision in favor of the litigant must be likely to remedy the suffered injury.29 The
importance of this element, called redressability, turns on the type of relief sought.
If the litigant seeks a remedy for a past harm, redressability is typically easy to
show. For instance, a plaintiff injured in a car accident caused by a negligent
defendant demonstrates redressability by showing that a judgment in her favor will
pay her medical bills, property damage, lost wages, or pain and suffering. However,
if a litigant seeks an injunction against current or future conduct, the injury must be
pled with enough specificity to show that harm will likely occur in the future unless
the court orders the conduct to cease. °
Normally, litigants must assert their own injury, as well as causation and
redressability, to demonstrate Article III standing. However, in certain situations,
parties are allowed to assert the injuries and interests of others. Known as thirdparty standing, this arrangement is allowed when the interests of the injured party
and the party seeking standing are sufficiently aligned and it would be difficult or
impractical for the injured parties to bring suit on their own behalf.3 ' For instance,
trade unions and other organizations have standing to bring suit on behalf of their
members.3 2 Members of a clearly defined and similarly aggrieved class also have
standing to assert the injuries of all class members, in addition to their own
interests. 33 A class action lawsuit is the prototypical form of third-party standing,
but the Court has allowed suits based on this theory to go forward in a number of
other situations. 34 The third-party standing doctrine is important in the initiative
and referendum context, because the Hollingswortb proponents attempted to assert
the interests of the state as well as their own.35 Before these issues are explored,
however, a more detailed exploration of ballot initiatives and legislative referenda is
necessary.
B. The Tools ofDirectDemocracy:Initiatives and Referenda

Unlike their federal counterpart, state constitutions are easily amended, and
such amendments are ratified rather frequently across the country. 36 A total of
9Id. at 561.
0 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106-07, 111-12 (1983).
31 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONST IIJTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs 83-91 (4th ed.

2011).

32Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-44, 346 (1977).

31See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 258 (1953) (finding that petitioner, sued for breach of a
racially restrictive covenant, had standing to represent the rights of Afiican-Americans against whom
the covenant was directed).
3 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976) (holding that a beer distributor can challenge
alcohol sales laws that discriminate on basis of sex); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)
(finding that a doctor convicted under statute prohibiting prescription of contraceptives can assert
constitutional rights of patients).
35Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013).
36Krislov & Katz, supra note 13, at 298, 304 n.34. As of 2012, the current versions of all U.S. state
constitutions had been amended 7378 times. John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendments and
IndividualRights in the Twenty-First Century, 76 ALB. L. REV. 2105, 2106 (2013).
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forty-nine states allow or require voters to approve state constitutional
amendments, Delaware being the lone outlier.37 Typically, this is done through the
legislative referendum, whereby state legislators propose constitutional
amendments or statutes, which are then submitted to the voters for approval or
rejection. 38 Twenty-four states take direct democracy a step further, and allow state
citizens or organizations to submit proposals for new laws or amendments. 39 This
device, the ballot initiative, requires the citizen-sponsor of the legislation, known as
the proponent, to gather a sufficient number of signatures on a petition before the
proposal will be placed on the ballot.' °
In the typical initiative process, a citizen or group of citizens, who wish to bring
about some policy change, submit a preliminary proposal to a specified state
agency. 41 This proposal is reviewed by state officials to ensure that it meets all the
state procedural requirements, and is given an official tide.42 Next, the proponents
petition individual citizens, attempting to collect the required number of signatures
in their jurisdiction. 43 This number varies from state to state, but is generally eight
percent or ten percent of the total votes cast in the most recent gubernatorial
election.' Once a sufficient number of signatures is gathered, the proposal is
allowing the initiative only
placed on the ballot for voter approval. 45 Most states
46
require a majority vote for enactment or ratification.
The referendum process is simpler, requiring only two basic steps. First, an
amendment is proposed in the legislature. 47 Once the proposal makes it out of
committee, it comes up for a vote before the entire legislative body.48 Here, states
are split as to whether a simple majority or supermajority is required for the
proposal to move forward. 49 The second step, voter approval, is identical to the
final step in the initiative process. Not surprisingly, because of the simplicity and
widespread nature of the referendum, it has historically been the most popular
method of constitutional change in the states, accounting for approximately ninety

" Krislov & Katz, supra note 13, at 301 n.23. Krislov & Katz identify seven different schemes in
which citizens are directly involved in enacting new laws or amendments. Id. at 302. However, each of
these schemes falls into one of two broad categories: proposals drafted by the legislature (referenda), and
proposals drafted by citizens or groups (initiatives). See id. For the purposes of analyzing standing to
defend in the wake of Hollingswortb, these categories are sufficiently distinct.
35
Id. at 302.
9WATERS, supranote 12, at 11-12.
'o Krislov & Katz, supra note 13, at 303.
41
Id. at 310.
42
Id. at 310-11.
43Id. at 311-12.
44
See id. at 313.
4
1Id. at 316.
46 See id. at 317.
47 See id. at 304.
45
See id. at 318-19.
49
See id. at 319.
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percent of state constitutional amendment proposals."0 However, the use of
initiatives for constitutional and statutory change has increased in recent years,51
2
being used to advance both conservative and liberal causes.5
These methods of amending state constitutions and enacting new laws,
especially the ballot initiative, have received a fair share of criticism. Particularly,
there is concern that when "voters ...pass laws directly without open deliberation
in a legislative forum,"5 3 the majority could infringe upon minority rights.5 4 Indeed,
voters have enacted laws restricting personal liberties, such as the ability to obtain a
same-sex marriage or for immigrants to receive welfare benefits.

5

Additionally,

many states with the initiative "prevent elected representatives from amending or
repealing laws enacted by popular vote."5 6 Finally, state courts seem reluctant to
invalidate initiatives, especially those enacting constitutional amendments; some
scholars have suggested that such measures are not receiving the judicial attention
57
they deserve.
Despite this criticism, initiatives and referenda remain overwhelmingly
important devices of legal and constitutional change. Particularly, constitutions
define the rules of the political game, the rights of the people, and their
relationships with one another and with the government. At the state level,
constitutions may accomplish a host of other objectives, such as setting out the
permissible structure of local government and specifying how state schools are
funded. 5 While constitutions are "semi-permanent institutions," they must also
"balance the efficiency created by their constancy with the need to adapt to
changing circumstances." 59 Twenty-four states have chosen to give their citizens a
direct method to determine which adaptations must be made, and nearly all states
give voters a voice in deciding these important issues. 60 Furthermore, these devices
are frequently used. In a seven-year span, state voters ratified 655 legislative
amendment proposals; in 2004 alone, voters considered sixty-two ballot
initiatives. 61 The initiative and referendum are important political tools, and should
10G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword,

Gettingfrom Here to There: Twenty-First Century

Mechanisms and Opportunitiesin State ConstitutionalReform, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1092 (2005).
s'See Krislov & Katz, supra note 13, at 307.
s Scott L. Kafker & David A. Russcol, Standing at a ConstitutionalDivide: Redyining State and
FederalRequirementsfor InitiativesAfter Hollingsworth v. Perry, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 299
(2014).
3
Fred 0. Smith, Jr., Due Process, Republicanism, andDirect Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 584
(2014).

14Id. at 596-97.
15 Id.at 585.
56
Id.at 584-85.
5 See Krislov & Katz, supra note 13, at 321-25 (discussing state judicial decisions concerning state
constitutional amendments and surveying arguments for and against heightened judicial scrutiny for
initiatives).

19See generally KY. CONST. §§ 156a-158, 183-189.
5' Krislov & Katz, supra note 13, at 327.
60WATERS, supra note 12, at 11-12.
6 Tarr & Williams, supra note 50, at 1092, 1102.
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therefore be taken seriously by the states that choose to implement them. However,
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry poses a significant
threat to the effectiveness of these processes, especially the initiative.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF STANDING AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY:
HOLLINGSWORTH V.PERRY

As outlined above, the initiative and referendum offer attractive, popular, and
fairly simple means for citizens to have a direct measure of influence in
government. Holingswortb v. Perry, the 2013 Supreme Court case finding that the
Proposition 8 proponents lacked standing, presents an obstacle to the effectiveness
of this process when it is used to bypass the executive branch. But Hollingswortb
was preceded by two significant cases dealing with similar standing issues. The
first, Karcher v. May, arose after the New Jersey Attorney General refused to
defend a statute requiring schools to hold a minute of silence at the beginning of
each day.62 The challenged law was not enacted via initiative or referendum, but
rather by the legislature after it overrode the governor's veto. 63 Alan Karcher and
Carmen Orechio, leaders of the New Jersey General Assembly and Senate,
defended the law in district court after the state Attorney General declined to do
so.' The district court struck down the law as unconstitutional. 65 After this ruling
was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, but before a notice of appeal
was filed with the Supreme Court, Karcher and Orechio were removed as party
leaders in their respective chambers. 66 The new party leaders declined to 67continue
the case, but Karcher and Orechio sought to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Denying standing, the Court held that "[their] intervention as presiding
legislative officers does not entitle them to appeal in their other individual and
professional capacities." 68 Once Karcher and Orechio lost their roles as party
leaders, they no longer had standing to continue the appeal. 69 Importantly,
however, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that an individual legislator
would have standing to continue the appeal; rather, it remained silent on this
issue.71 Of course, Karcber did not deal with a law passed through either an
initiative or referendum. But by declining to answer the question of individual
legislator standing, the Court left this possibility open. As shown below, this
notion is significant for securing the continuing viability of the referendum device.

62Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 74-75 (1987).
63Id. at 74.
64See id. at 75.
65Id.
66See id. at 76.
67 Id.
68

1 d. at 78.

69 id.
70 See

id. at 81.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

A second case, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, dealt directly with
standing issues in a challenge to a ballot initiative.71 In 1988, Arizonans amended
their state constitution through a ballot initiative to establish English as the official
language of the state.7 2 Challenged as overbroad, the district court struck down the
amendment. 73 Afterwards, the governor declared that she would not appeal the
district court's ruling, and the initiative's official proponents, Arizonans for Official
English (AOE), sought to intervene.74 Finding that AGE lacked standing to
appeal, the Court wrote, "An intervenor cannot step into the shoes of the original
party unless the intervenor independently 'fulfills the requirements of Article III." 7
The Court noted that AOE was not authorized under Arizona law to defend their
measure, and that no member of AOE asserted a "concrete injury" sufficient for
third party standing by the organization. 76 However, this assessment of AOE's lack
of defensive standing was dicta; the Court held that the case was moot because the
77
original plaintiff had resigned from her employment with the state.
These two cases, along with the previous discussion of the initiative and
referendum, provide sufficient context to analyze the Hollingsworth case. In
response to a 2008 California Supreme Court ruling that the state's definition of
marriage between one man and one woman violated the state constitution's equal
protection dause, 78 voters approved Proposition 8, amending the state constitution
to provide that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized
in California." 79 Under the California Constitution and California Elections Code,
individuals or groups may propose constitutional amendments and force their
inclusion on the ballot once a sufficient number of signatures has been gathered on
a petition. s0 In the case of Proposition 8, opponents of same-sex marriage
successfully circulated petitions, allowing California voters to approve the
s1
measure.
After its enactment, same-sex couples brought suit in federal court, alleging
violations of their due process and equal protection rights.82 The governor, attorney
general, and other named defendants in the suit refused to defend the newly
enacted amendment, so the district court allowed the official proponents of
71Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
72
Id.
at 49.
73
1Id.at 55.
74
1d. at 55-56.
7
1Id. at 65 (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986)).
76
Id. at 65-66.
77Id.at 66-67.
"' See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008).
79CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7-5, invalidatedby Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 3:09-CV-02292 (N.D.
Cal. filed Aug. 4, 2010); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9000-18 (LEXIS through Chapter 807 of the 2015
Legislative Session) (describing the process governing initiative proposals).
soCAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
8' Lisa Leff, Prop 8 To The Supreme Court? California Gay Marriage Ban Backers Look Ahead,

HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2012, 5:12 AM), http://www.hufftmgtonpost.com/2012/06/05/prop-8to-the-supreme-cour-tn_1571509.htnl.
2 HoUingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2260 (2013).
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Proposition 8 to intervene. s3 After the district court found Proposition 8
unconstitutional, 84 the proponents sought to appeal to the Ninth Circuit." Before
ruling on the merits, the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the California
Supreme Court, asking whether ballot initiative proponents have standing under
California law to defend the measure when public officials decline to do so. 86 In
Peny v. Brown, the California Supreme Court held that the proponents were
"authorized under California law to appear and assert the state's interest in the
initiative's validity."87 Based on the California Supreme Court's answer, the Ninth
Circuit reached the merits of the challenge to Proposition 8, affirming the district
88
court and finding the amendment unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
The proponents appealed once again, and the United States Supreme Court
to address the issue of Article III standing in
granted certiorari, asking the parties
89
addition to the merits of the case.
Writing for a five-justice majority, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that the
"petitioners had no 'direct stake' in the outcome of their appeal," seeking only to
defend the constitutionality of a state law.9" Such a desire, the Court held, was only
9

a "generalized grievance" insufficient to satisfy Article III's standing requirement. '
The proponents did have a special role in collecting signatures, submitting their
92
proposal, and arguing for its inclusion on the ballot. But once Proposition 8 was
enacted as a constitutional amendment, the proponents were no longer situated any
93
differently than the rest of California's citizens. Furthermore, the Court held that
the petitioners could not assert the State's interests as their own through third94
party standing because the petitioners themselves suffered no "injury in fact."
According to the Court, "mere authorization" by the state to represent its interests
9
was simply not sufficient. " Nor was the California Supreme Court's answer to the
Ninth Circuit's certified question sufficient for the Court, who characterized the
96
proponent's interest in defending Proposition 8 as only "generalized." Finally, the

931d.

Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
n Hollingswortb, 133 S.Ct. at 2260.
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011).
v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Cal. 2011).
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012).
9 Hollingstorth,133 S.Ct. at 2661.
90Id. at 2662.
(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992)).
9'See id.
'7Perry

92See id.

91Id. at 2663.
9'Id. at 2664. The Court based this aspect of its holding on Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54
(1986). In Diamond, an abortion opponent was unable to demonstrate standing to pursue the Seventh
Circuit's injunction against an Illinois abortion law when the state declined to do so, even with a letter
from the state attorney general saying that the individual and the state asserted the same interests,
because the petitioner could not demonstrate any injury in fact of his own. See id. at 65.
95Hollingsworth,133 S.Ct. at 2665.
96Id. at 2666 ("IT]he authority... [the proponents] enjoy is simply the authority to participate as
parties in a court action to asset legal arguments in defense of the state's interest in the validity of the
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Court noted that "the most basic features of an agency relationship [were]
missing," including the principal's power to control or remove the agent, the
fiduciary duties owed by the agent, and reimbursement of the agent's expenses by
97
the principal.
In dissent, Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor)
began by pointing out that the California Supreme Court's determination of state
law is binding upon the U.S. Supreme Court.9" Therefore, when the California
court ruled that the Proposition 8 proponents were authorized under the California
Elections Code to assert the state's interest, the Court should not second-guess
that court's interpretation of California statutes. 99 Furthermore, the dissent noted
that the formal requirements of an agency relationship are ill-equipped for the
unique situation of a ballot initiative, given the uncertainty as to who the principal
is and how they would exercise control."° Finally, unlike the majority, the dissent
emphasized policy considerations, pointing out that the majority's decision
undermines the "prime purpose of justiciability," namely "to ensure vigorous
advocacy" by the party who has the best incentives to litigate.0l'
The Court's holding in Hollingswortb undermines the effectiveness of the
initiative and referendum processes in several ways. These devices, especially the
ballot initiative, are intended to place a measure of democratic power in the hands
of the people. In many cases, as in Hollingswortb, the popularly enacted law or
amendment is contrary to the wishes of the state's elected officials. l02 When all
goes as planned, the referendum and initiative operate as a bypass around the
executive veto power or around a legislature that declines to take up or pass new
legislation. But under Hollingswortb, when that new law is challenged and state
officials refuse to defend it, the government effectively uses a veto that state law
does not authorize. The people are denied a power that they rightfully possess, and
the government exercises a power that it does not have."0 3 The Hollingswortb
decision is also not in accord with the separation of powers justification for the
standing doctrine. If the Court had reached the merits of Proposition 8, it would
have either upheld a law duly enacted by California voters or struck down a
measure infringing upon a fundamental right of a minority104 This is not a step
initiative measure. That interest is by definition a generalized one." (internal citations and quotation
marks
97 omitted)).
Id. at 2666-67.
9
Id. at 2668 (Kennedy,
99

J., dissenting).

Id. at 2669-70.

'00Id. at 2671.

'01Id. at 2674.

102For instance, leaders in the Colorado state legislature opposed the use of a ballot initiative to

legalize the possession and recreational use of marijuana. Ivan Moreno, ColoradoLawmakers WarnAbout
Constitutional Hazards of Marijuana Legalization, DAILY CAMERA (Sep. 05, 2012, 11:03 PM),
http://www.dailycamera.com/state-west-news/ci-21477445/colorado-lawmakers-wam-aboutconstitutional-hazards-marijuana-legalization.
'53See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 52, at 300.
104Joshua Abbotoy, A 7[Non]essentialLimit on Our Power"" Standing Doctrine andJudicialRestraint
in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013), 37 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POLVY 363,372 (2014).
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has had the power to review acts of the
outside the role of the judiciary, which
10 5
legislature since Marbury v. Madison.

Aside from these democratic concerns, the Hollingsworth decision also has a
practical effect on the development of judicial precedent. Federal courts are now
unable to reach the merits of cases involving important constitutional issues. This
stunts the growth of the common law as demonstrated by two hypotheticals.
Suppose that a state's voters enact through the ballot initiative process a law that
the state's executive officials oppose for political reasons, and that the law is
challenged on federal constitutional grounds by a person whom the law harms. In
this first scenario, further suppose that the law is objectively unconstitutional; that
is to say, if the Supreme Court were to rule on the merits of the law, it would be
unanimously struck down. Here, if the government officials refuse to defend the
law, it will be invalidated, because under Hollingsworth no one else can demonstrate
Article III standing. In this case, the correct outcome is reached (an
unconstitutional law is unenforceable), but the reviewing courts are unable to rle
on the merits, preventing them from generating potentially important precedent.
This is essentially what happened in Hollingswortr,had the Supreme Court been
able to rule on the merits of Proposition 8, the same-sex marriage debate would
have been significantly tempered." ° Instead, lower federal courts across the country
spent three years hearing challenges to various marriage laws, until the Court
finally settled the matter in Obergefell. One of the purposes of the standing doctrine
is the promotion of judicial economy, but in this specific application, judicial
economy was harmed rather than promoted.
Perhaps even more concerning are the consequences when government officials
decline to defend an objectively constitutional initiative. In this hypothetical, the
law in question is challenged, and the government refuses to appear in court to
defend it. Here, this refusal could result in a default judgment in favor of the
challengers. The district court might also make an incorrect ruling on the merits,
striking down the initiative. If the government declines to appeal this ruling, and
no one else has standing to do so, the law will remain invalidated. In either case, a
duly enacted and otherwise constitutional law is taken off the books because
government leaders were politically opposed to the will of the people who enacted
the measure. These hypotheticals demonstrate the effective veto power the
Hollingsworth decision gives state government leaders and the larger democratic
concerns raised by Hollingsworth.

105Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-74 (1803).
16 This scenario also sets up a rather perverse incentive for officials to continue to enforce laws with

which they disagree so that the cases against these laws do not become moot. This is essentially what
happened in both Hollingswortb and Windsor. State and federal officials enforced Proposition 8 and
DOMA even though they disagreed with the laws, ensuring the cases remained justiciable, but declined
to actually defend on the merits, hoping that the laws would be invalidated for lack of defensive
standing. See Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions andJusticiability,66 FLA. L. REV. 553, 614 (2014).
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OVERCOMING THE HOLLNGSWORTH STANDING OBSTACLE

The effectiveness of initiatives and referenda largely turns on whether there is a
mechanism for those laws to be tested on their merits. These devices are often used
as a bypass around gridlocked legislatures and obstructionist executives. If the
executive is able to exercise effective veto power by simply ordering the state
attorney general not to pursue an appeal, the initiative and referenda will decline in
their usefulness. Seeing this futility, citizens and legislators might become wary of
proposing amendments in the first place, stunting the ability of state constitutions
to adapt to societal changes. While Hollingswortb does significantly frustrate these
important democratic and political objectives, all is not lost. At least three viable
solutions to the Holingsworth standing obstacle exist: special state attorneys,
10 7
explicit delegation of agency authority, and monetary incentives.
One possible option to overcome the standing obstacle would be appointing a
special state attorney to act as an agent of the state on a case-by-case basis. This
would almost certainly satisfy the shortcomings of the Hollingswortbpetitioners, as
the special attorney would be hired as an agent of the state, and not asserting his or
her own interests." s This process would also be familiar to the states, as special
attorneys are routinely appointed in cases where full-time government lawyers have
a conflict of interest. While states might find this solution easy to administer, the
uncertainty comes in deciding who will be the special attorney. Presumably, the
provision and appointment process for selecting the special attorney would be
defined by statute. However, the same special attorney could not represent the state
in every constitutional challenge in perpetuity, so there would be some element of
choice in this decision. But who gets to decide? Executive branch officials, who at
this point must necessarily have declined to defend the law, might have perverse
incentives to appoint a special attorney who would not be the best-equipped person
for the job. Sponsoring legislators or official proponents could also play a role in
the appointment process, but the added number of persons and groups, each with
their own particularized interests, might make it hard to reach a consensus.
A second option would be the explicit designation of the official proponents as
agents of the state for the purposes of defending their enacted proposal. Essentially,
the persons or groups advocating for the measure, and therefore those with the best
incentive to defend it, would stand in the shoes of the state for this specific case.
This could also be accomplished by statute, and would eliminate the element of
choice inherent in the special state attorney solution. However, this solution rests
107 Some scholars have recently suggested an additional possibility, that the Court recognize a

categorical exception to the standing requirement for sponsors of ballot initiatives. Matthew A. Melone
& George A. Nation III, "Standing"on Formality: Hollingsworth v. Perry and the Efficacy of Direct
Democracy in the United States, 29 BYU J. PUB. L. 25, 80-81 (2014). Such an exception would certainly
be the simplest solution to the defensive standing problem; however, the purpose of this Note is to
suggest proactive solutions for state legislatures to implement. Additionally, the viability of such an
argument is suspect given the Court's recent hostility to proponent standing in Windsor.
10'Kafker & Russcol, supra note 52, at 28 7-88.
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on more tenuous grounds, given the language of Hollingsworth. While agency
would be established by statute, "[t]he Hollingsworth majority . . . is dearly
uncomfortable with this agency approach because it collapses the Court's dear
distinction between public and private injury."" 9 In this scenario, the proponents
would still not be suffering any injury unique to themselves. To remedy this
problem, scholars have proposed additional requirements for official proponents to
satisfy. They could be required to swear an oath, further solidifying the fiduciary
nature of their relationship with the state."' Proponents could also be required to
post an appeal bond, giving them a financial stake in the outcome of the case." l '
Additionally, a key element of agency law is the principal's ability to control the
agent.'1 2 The state would need to have some oversight of the proponents during
the litigation, 1 13 with the possibility of removal and replacement for misfeasance.
Designating the official proponent of an initiative as the state's agent also does not
solve the Hollingsworth standing problem when a referendum is challenged. But in
Karcher, the Court left open the possibility that legislators, especially those in
leadership roles, could have standing to defend enacted legislation.1 14 The statute
could have a provision codifying this principle in the case of a referendum first
proposed in the legislature.
Certain monetary incentives, such as a defender's bounty or a refundable filing
15
fee, could also be required of those seeking to defend an initiative or referendum.
In qui tam actions, such as federal whistleblower cases, private plaintiffs are given a
bounty for successfully prosecuting a claim alongside the government."l 6 These
plaintiffs, called "relators or informers," "need not have suffered any personal injury,
need not be government officials, and need not have any formal agency
relationship" with the government, but still have standing." 7

In

theory, the

potential for a similar monetary reward upon successful defense of the statute
would give proponents a stake in the outcome. The Hollingsworth majority,
however, seemed to question whether a qui tam-like bounty would be sufficient,
especially given the fact that the injury would not actually stem from the challenged
statute itself ." l
Perhaps a better alternative would be requiring initiative
proponents to pay a filing fee before the initiative is placed on the ballot,

1011d. at 289.
110See id. at 289-90.
111See id.
5
" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFAGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).
113Kafker & Russcol, supra note 52, at 290.
114Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 81 (1987).
115Kafker & Russcol, supra note 52, at 291.
116 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2006). See generally Sean Elameto, Guarding the Guardians:
Accountability in Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 41 PUB. CONT. LJ. 813 (2012);
Thomas R. Lee, Comment, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the FalseClaims Act, 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 543 (1990).
117Ryan W. Scott, Standing to Appeal andExecutive Non-Defense ofFederalLaw After the Marriage
Cases, 89 IND. LJ. 67, 78-79 (2014).
...
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652,2665 (2013).
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refundable upon the successful defense of the initiative. 9 This would give the
proponents a direct financial stake tied to the challenged law itself, not merely a
reward for winning the case.' 20 Financial harm is the prototypical injury for
standing purposes. A preemptive fding fee would seem to satisfy all three elements
of Article III standing, and would also be a viable option.' 2' This would also
incentivize proponents to think carefilly before proposing legally questionable
amendments. It is difficult to say with any certainty what filing fee amount, if any,
would satisfy the Court. A sum that would be seen as dearly more than nominal,
122
but not so burdensome as to discourage new proposals would be optimal.
Of these possibilities, which is preferable? For several reasons, a statutory
delegation of agency to the official proponent of a ballot initiative or the legislative
sponsor of a public referendum, combined with the posting of a refundable filing
fee in ballot initiative cases, is the best approach to overcoming the Hollingsworth
standing obstacle. At a basic level, this would be relatively simple to administer and
would avoid the potential controversy that might result if the executive branch has
some leeway in choosing the special attorney or agent. Additionally, Hollingsworth
seems to make room for an explicit statutory grant of agency authority. In
Arizonansfor Official English v. Arizona, the Court stated in dicta: "We are aware of
no Arizona law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to
defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the
State."'23 The HollingsworthCourt cited Arizonansfor OfficialEnglish as support for

its finding that the decision of the California Supreme Court did not vest the
Proposition 8 proponents with standing, 124 but did not comment on whether the
hypothetical law described in Arizonans for Official English would suffice in this
type of case. Combined with the Court's emphasis on the lack of a formal agency
relationship between the proponents and the state, the majority opinion's silence
seems inviting to a state wishing to fill in these empty spaces. A statute that grants
explicit agency authority to initiative proponents would seem to erase, or at least
mitigate, these shortcomings in the Hollingsworthpetitioners' case.
Proponent standing also ensures that the party with the best incentive to litigate
is the party that appears in court. If executive branch officials were required by law
to defend even those measures with which they disagree, they would certainly do so
to avoid being held in contempt. But beyond mere appearance in court, there is no
good way to ensure that state officials put forth a full defense. And while a special
state attorney might be insulated from the political climate of the executive branch,
the officials who disagree with the law would still be in charge of hiring the person
to defend it. When the interests of the voters, the proponents, and the executive do
Kafker & Russcol, supra note 52, at 292.
"0 Id. at 293-94.
121Id. at 293.
" Kafker and Russcol propose a $1,000 fee. Id. at 292-93.
'23 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997).
124 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013) (citing Arizonansfor Official English, 520
"'

U.S. at 65).
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not align, designation of the proponents would avoid the incentives problem
altogether. Because the process would be set out ahead of time, the executive
branch would play no role in the selection of the party who appears in court.
Rather, the executive would act in a purely ministerial role, certifying that
proponents have met the statutory requirements to have their proposals placed on
the ballot. The proponents, who fostered the amendment from conception, to
petition or legislative proposal, and finally to vote would simply be allowed to see
the process through to the end. This system would also give politicians deniability
when a popularly-enacted law turns out to be not so popular. The governor or
attorney general can point to the proponents and the political process, avoiding at
least some potential backlash.
Finally, at least one state has already pursued a similar course of action.
Arizona, a state that allows laws to be enacted through initiative or referendum,
passed Senate Bill 1210 in 2012, giving standing to official proponents and
sponsoring legislators. 125 This legislation was in direct response to the Proposition
8 controversy and the Hollingsworth decision. 126 The statute provides that when
"the constitutionality.., of a law that was enacted through an initiative is at issue,
the official initiative proponent .

.

. that wishes to defend the law shall have the

right to intervene as a party and is deemed to have proper standing in the
matter."127 When a law enacted through a referendum is challenged, "the legislator
who was the first prime sponsor of the referendum" is granted the same rights of
standing and intervention, provided he or she wishes to do so. 121 Unless a party
not have a good faith intention
raises an objection that a "proposed intervenor does
29
to defend the law," intervention must be allowed.
Arizona's statute provides a succinct and rather straightforward solution to the
Hollingsworth standing obstacle. The advocate of a proposed law or constitutional
amendment has the right to intervene in every case, leaving no discretion to the
reviewing court. However, Arizona's law is not above criticism. First, proponents or
sponsoring legislators have the right to intervene in any case, at any time, not just
on appeal. An additional party at the trial level, who may have different
motivations and concerns than the executive branch, creates the potential for
confusion and the proliferation of issues unnecessary to the initial determination of
the questioned law's constitutionality. Second, in the case of a referendum, it is
unclear what happens if both the executive branch and the legislative sponsor

115ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-921 (LEXIS through 2015 1st Reg. Sess., all acts except chapters 10,
262 and 265).
208,230,247,253,
26
1 An Act Amending Title 12, Chapter7, Ariz, Revised Statutes, by AddingArtide 6.1; Relating to the

Right of Intervention:Hearingon S.B. 1210 Before the Ariz. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary,50th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2012) [hereinafter Hearing on S.B. 1210] (statement of Sen. Andy Biggs, sponsor of bill)
(Westlaw).
127§ 12-921(A) (LEXIS).
128 § 12-921(B) (LEXIS).
129§ 12-921(C) (LEXIS).
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decline to defend on appeal.1 30 Finally, the statute gives courts no guidance as to
how a "good faith intention" is to be determined, 3 ' although it is unlikely that an
initiative proponent or referendum sponsor will seek to invalidate a law of their
own making. Whether these possible deficiencies are problematic or fatal to the
statute is unclear, as of the time this Note was published, the Arizona statute has
yet to be challenged or cited in an appellate court opinion.
Taking into account state concerns in protecting the initiative and referendum
processes, the possible room in Hollingsworth to accomplish proponent standing,
and the deficiencies in the Arizona bill, what would a state statute authorizing
standing look like? First, the statute must state in dear and unequivocal language
that the official proponents of ballot initiatives are agents of the state government
for the purposes of defending their enacted proposal, should the state itself decline
to do so. The drafters should also include specific provisions mirroring the
Restatement (Third) of Agency, given the Hollingswortb majority's focus on the
lack of formality in the state-proponent relationship. The state should be able to
control the conduct of the proponent to a reasonable degree and to remove the
proponent in narrowly defined circumstances (for instance, when the opponent is
sanctioned by the court for fraudulent or dilatory litigation tactics). The proponent
must also owe fiduciary duties to the state. Finally, states should amend the statutes
setting out their initiative process to require the posting of a modest filing fee upon
the submission of the initiative proposal, a portion of which would be refundable
upon the successful defense of the enacted initiative. Combined, these actions
should be sufficient under Hollingsworth to grant proponent standing in initiative
cases.
In challenges to referenda, the solution is much simpler, to a point. In Karcher,
the Court did not foreclose the possibility that legislators could, in some
circumstances, have standing to defend legislation.' 32 This question was similarly
unanswered in Hollingswortb.133 However, by the time the law in Karcher was
challenged, the legislative party leaders who presided when the law was passed were
no longer in leadership roles, and therefore the Court held that they had no
standing for their former positions. 134 A state drafting its own standing statute
would be wise to codify the principles of Karcher as a failsafe if it in fact wanted
sponsoring legislators to have standing to defend their enacted referenda. Of
course, legislators should be exempt from any provisions requiring a refundable
filing fee, as it would be impractical to require a lawmaker to pay a fee each time he
or she proposed a new constitutional amendment. States might also want former
legislators or outside interest groups to stand in for the state when referenda are
130The legislative history of the statute does suggest that a legislator, who sponsored the
referendum in question, but retired before it was constitutionally challenged, may still intervene. Hearing
on SB. 1210, supra note 126.

§ 12-921(C) (LEXIS).

132Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 79-81 (1987).
133Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664-65 (2013).
'"4 Karcber, 484 U.S. at 81.
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challenged. However, given that neither of these parties would have a formal
relationship with the state, nor have a financial interest in the amendment itself,
the state's ability to establish standing in these situations is tenuous at best.
CONCLUSION

The ballot initiative and legislative referendum are devices of great significance
in the United States' scheme of federalism. The federal Constitution is rigid and
amendments are rare. But state constitutions are designed to be more fluid,
adapting to changing societal circumstances. Initiatives and referenda are the
primary methods by which this change is accomplished. They are also powerful
means through which state citizens have a direct input in the laws that control their
daily lives. Nearly every person in the United States is or could be affected in some
way by a state constitutional amendment that was enacted by initiative or
referendum. Furthermore, the initiative and referendum are used to accomplish a
wide range of policy objectives, including finance, taxation, and rights-related
goals.i 35 Some rights-related amendments increase personal liberties beyond the
guarantees of the U.S. Constitution, while others seek to rein in "expansive state
court decisions," as was the case in Hollingsworth.36
States that value these political devices should respond to Hollingsworth in a
way that preserves these institutions. However, the doctrine of standing is currently
a stumbling block in the path of this goal. Standing lies at the very heart of federal
court jurisprudence and derives its basis from our nation's founding document.
Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has been wary to relax these standards,
even when there are compelling policy reasons to do so. Given this reluctance,
there may not be a solution to the Hollingsworth standing obstacle; admittedly, the
Court has never found standing for ballot initiative proponents seeking to defend
their proposals after enactment.1 37 Even if states desire initiative and referendum
proponents to have standing, "standing in federal court is a question of federal law,
not state law ...the fact that a State thinks a private party should have standing to
seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override [the Supreme Court's] settled
law to the contrary."138 But a dose reading of the majority opinion in Hollingswortb
does provide some helpful hints.
The thrust of the Court's displeasure with the position of the Proposition 8
proponents can be boiled down to two essential elements: the proponents had no
relationship with the state sufficient to assert the state's interest, and the
proponents suffered no distinct injury of their own. The solution proposed above
attempts to remedy both of these shortcomings. An express delegation of agency by
statute would clearly define the nature of the relationship between initiative
...
See Dinan, supranote 36, at 2108.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 14-15; c. Dinan, supra note 36, at 2106-09 (discussing
rights-related
state constitutional amendments, including "citizen-initiated amendments").
37
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997).
135Hollingswortb, 133 S. Ct. at 2667.
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proponents and the state, and would incorporate Restatement agency principles. In
theory, such an arrangement would satisfy the Court's concern about the lack of
congruence between the positions of the state and the proponents. Requiring a
filing fee at the time of submission for ballot initiative proposals, refundable upon
the successful defense of the enacted proposal, would vest in the proponents a
financial stake in the outcome of the case, one that arose before the case began.
Combined, these remedies should be enough to assuage the Court's concerns, and
satisfy the Article III standing requirements.
This solution is necessarily speculative in nature; currently, only Arizona has
attempted anything of the sort, and its statute has yet to be subjected to judicial
scrutiny.139 It may simply be the case that states cannot overcome Hollingsworth.
That would be highly unfortunate, considering the importance of the ballot
initiative and legislative referendum to the direct democracy the states have
increasingly embraced. Removing the Hollingsworth standing obstacle will allow
federal courts to reach the merits of these important cases, giving finality to both
litigants and the public at large, and promote judicial economy. Hopefully, states
will recognize the threat posed to this aspect of self-governance, and act swiftly to
protect it.

139 The Court has, however, recently heard arguments in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892
(2015), a case addressing "[w]hether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who
suffers no concrete harm . . . by authorizing a private right of action based upon a bare violation of a
federal statute." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, (No. 13-1339) (petitionfor
cert.granted Apr. 27, 2015). This case should shed some light on a legislature's ability to confer Article
III standing. However, based upon the current formulation of the question presented, this case should
not directly address a state's ability to confer Article III standing in a challenge to state law.
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RICHARD A. WESTIN, Professor of Law (Emeritus 2015). BA 1967, MBA 1968, Columbia
University, JD 1972, University of Pennsylvania

FACULTY

ALBERTINA ANTOGNINI, Assistant Professor of Law. BA 2004, Stanford University, JD 2008,
Harvard University
RICHARD C. AUSNESS, Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor
of Law. BA 1966, JD 1968, University of Florida; LLM 1973, Yale University
SCOTT BAURIES, Robert G. Lawson Associate Professor of Law. BA 1995, University of West
Florida; MEd 2001, University of South Florida; JD 2005, PhD 2008, University of Florida
JENNIFER BIRD-POLAN, James and Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of Law. BA 1999, Penn
State University-, JD 2007, Harvard University;, M.A. 2012, Vanderbilt University
TINA BROOKS, Electronic Services Librarian. BA 2005, UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN IOWA;JD
2009, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA COLLEGE OF LAW; MS 2011, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

RUTHEFORD B CAMPBELL, JR., Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law. BA 1966, Centre College; JD
1969, University of Kentucky-, LLM 1971, Harvard University
MARIANNAJACKSON CLAY, Visiting Professor of Law. B.A. 1975; JD 1978, University of
Kentucky
ALLISON CONNELLY, Director of the UK Legal Clinic and James and Mary Lassiter Professor of
Law. BA 1980, JD 1983, University of Kentucky
MARYJ. DAVIS, Stites & Harbison Professor of Law. BA 1979, University of Virginia; JD 1985,
Wake Forest University
JAMES M. DONOVAN, Law Library Director and James and Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of
Law. BA 1981, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; MLIS 1989, Louisiana State
University-, PhD 1994, Tulane University-, MA 2000, Louisiana State University;, JD 2003,
Loyola New Orleans School of Law
JOSHUA A. DOUGLAS, Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune Associate Professor of Law. BA
2002; JD 2007, George Washington University
CHRISTOPHERW. FROST, Thomas P. Lewis Professor of Law. BBA 1983; JD 1986, University of
Kentucky
BRYAN L. FRYE, Assistant Professor of Law. B.A. 1995, University of California, Berkeley-,
M.F.A. 1997, San Francisco Art Institute; JD 2005, New York University

EUGENE R. GAETKE, Edward T. Breathitt Professor of Law. BA 1971; JD 1974, University of

Minnesota
MARY LOUISE EVERETT GRAHAM, Senator Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law. BA 1965, JD

1977, University of Texas

JANE

GRISL, Director of Academic Success and Professor of Legal Writing. BA;JD 1973,

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

ROBERTA M. HARDING, Professor of Law. B S 1981, University of San Francisco; JD 1986,

Harvard University
KRISTINJ. HAZELWOOD, Assistant Professor of Legal Research and Writing. BA 1996, University

of Louisville; JD 1999, Washington and Lee University
MICHAEL P. HEALY, Senator Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law. BA 1978, Williams College; JD
1984, University of Pennsylvania
MARK F. KIGHTLINGER, Edward T. Breathitt Associate Professor of Law. BA 1981, Williams
College; JD 1988, Yale Law School
CORTNEY E. LOLLAR, Assistant Professor of Law. BA 1997, Brown University;,JD 2002 New
York Univerisity
DOUGLAS MICHAEL, Stites & Harbison Professor of Law. AB 1979, Stanford University;, MBA
1982, JD 1983, University of California
KATHYRN L. MOORE, Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law. AB 1983,
University of Michigan; JD 1988, Cornell University
MELYNDAJ. PRICE, Robert E. Harding, Jr. Professor of Law. BS 1995, Prairie View A & M
University-, JD 2002, University of Texas; PhD 2006, University of Michigan
FRANKLIN RUNGE, Faculty Services Librarian. BA 2000, Hiram College; JD 2003, Northeastern
University of Lav, MLS 2010, Indiana University
PAUL E. SALAMANCA, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs Professor of Law. AB 1983, Dartmouth College;
JD 1989, Boston College
ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law and William L.
Matthews, Jr. Professor of Law. BA 1967, Amherst College; JD 1970, Harvard University
COLLIN SCHUELER, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law. BA 2006, University of Michigan; JD

2010 University of Kentucky
BEAU STEENKEN, Instructional Services Librarian. BA 2000, University of Texas at Austin; JD
2003, University of Texas School of Law, LLM 2003, University of Nottingham, United
Kingdom; MS 2008, Texas State University-San Marcos; MSIS 2010, University of Texas
School of Information
RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD, William L. Matthews, Jr. Professor of Law. BA 1969; JD 1976, The
Ohio State University
HAROLD R. WEINBERG, Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law. AB 1966; JD 1969, Case
Western Reserve University; LLM 1975, University of Illinois

SARAH N. WELLING, Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law and Laramie L.

Leatherman Professor of Law. BA 1974, University ofWisconsin; JD 1978, University of Kentucky
ANDREW K. WOODS, Assistant Professor of Law. AB 2002, Brown University, JD 2007, Harvard

University;, PhD 2012, University of Cambridge

ADJUNCT FACULTY
GLEN S. BAGBY, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1966, Transylvania University;, JD 1969,

University of Kentucky. Firm: Dinsmore & Shohl
FRANK T. BECKER, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1979, University of Kentucky. Equine and
Commercial Law and Litigaiton Practitioner
DON P. CETRULO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1971, Morehead State University, JD 1974,
University of Kentucky. Firm: Knox & Cetrulo
JENNIFER COFFMAN, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1969, JD 1978, University of Kentucky.

Retired Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Kentucky
REBECCA DILORETO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1981, Amherst College; JD 1985, University

of Kentucky. Children's Law Center
ANDREW DORISIO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BS 1980, West Virginia University;, JD 1996,
University of Kentucky. Firm: King & Schickli
CHARLES FASSLER, Adjunct Professor of Law. BS 1967, Brooklyn College; JD 1970, University of
Wisconsin Law School; LLM 1974, New York University School of Law
WILLIAM GARMER, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1975, University of Kentucky. Firm: Garmer &
Prather PLLC.
JANET GRAHAM, Adjunct Professor of Law. BS 1987, Virginia Tech University, JD 1991,

University of Kentucky College of Law. Commissioner of Law, Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Government
KAREN GREENWELL, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1976, JD 1985, University of Kentucky.

Firm: Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs
PIERCE W. HAMBLIN, Adjunct Professor of Law. BBA 1973, JD 1977, University of Kentucky.
Firm: Landrum & Shouse
JAMES G. HARRALSON, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1979, University of Kentucky. Retired

Associate General Counsle for AT&T Mobility
JOHN HAYS, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1985, Princeton University, JD 1988, University of

Kentucky. Firm: Jackson Kelly
G. EDWARD HENRY II, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1976, JD 1979, University of Kentucky.
Firm: Henry, Watz, Raine & Marino
GAYLE W. HERNDON, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1982, University of Kentucky. Retired Tax

Counsel for Tax Policy and Planning at the General Electric Company
PAULA HOLBROOK, Adjunct Professor of Law. BS 1990, JD 1993, University of Kentucky. UK

HealthCare
GUION JOHNSTONE, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 2005, Transylvania University, MSW 2011,
JD 2011, University of Louisville. Director of Maxwell Street Legal Clinic
EMILYJONES, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 2011, University of Kentucky. Immigration Attorney
at Kentucy Refugee Ministries
RAYMOND M. LARSON, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1970, University of Kentucky. Fayette

County Commonwealth Attorney
JOHN T. MCGARVEY, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1970,JD 1973, University of Kentucky. Firm:

Morgan & Pottinger
GEORGE MILLER, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1975, AM 1978, Brown University;, PhD 1981,

Brown University;, JD 1984, University of Kentucky. Firm: Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs
MARGARET PISACANO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BSN 1980, Vanderbilt; JD 1983, University of

Kentucky. Associate General Counsel and Director of Risk Management at University of
Kentucky's Chandler Medical Center
DAMON PRESTON, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1991, Transylvania University, JD 1994,

Harvard. Deputy Public Advocate
STEVEN ROUSE, Adjunct

Professor of Law. AB 1999, University of Illinois; JD 2006,
Northwestern University

THALETIA ROUrT, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 2000, University of Kentucky. Associate

General Counsel for University of Kentucky
THOMAS E. RUTLEDGE, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1985, St. Louis University, JD 1990,

University of Kentucky. Firm: Stoll Keenon Ogden
LINDA SMITH, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1997, Transylvania University-, JD 1994, Northern

Kentucky Salmon P. Chase College of Law
LARRY SYKES, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1975, Vanderbilt University, JD 1983, University of

Kentucky. Firm: Stoll Keenon Ogden
WILLIAM THRO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1986, Hanover College; MA 1988, University of
Melbourne (Australia); JD 1990, University of Virginia School of Law
M. LEE TURPIN, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1997, Transylvania University, JD 1992,
University of Kentucky College of Law. First Assistant County Attorney
ANDREA WELKER, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1997, Transylvania University, JD 2009,

University of Kentucky College of Law
CHARLES WISDOM, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1985, University of Louisville. Chief, Appellate

Section, US Attorney's Office
JEFFREY YOST, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1972, West Virginia University, LL.M. 1979

Georgetown University. Firm: Jackson Kelly PLLC

